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) 
[So F. No. 18522. In Bank. Jan. 18, 1955.J 
MABEL BLACK et aL, Respondents, v. CUTTER LABOR-
ATORIES (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Arbitration-Award-Validity.-An arbitra.tion award which 
directs that a mem ber of Communist party who is dedicated 
to that party's program of sabotage, force, violence and the 
like be reinstated to employment in a plant which produces 
antibiotics used by both the military and civilians, is against 
public policy as expressed in federal and state laws, is illegal 
and void, and will not be enforced by courts. 
[2] Master and Servant-Specific Performance of Oontract for 
Personal Services - Disloyalty to Employer - Defenses.-A 
private employer, particularly one largely engaged in supply-
ing manufactured products to government, to its armed forces 
and to public at large, should not be required by state action 
through its courts to retain in or restore to e:rployment a 
person who would not be entitled to .;:t,f..e employment and 
who is known to have dedicated hers(-I, LO service of foreign 
power and to practice of sabotage to the end of overthrowing 
our government. 
[3] Id.-Duties-Loyalty-Implications of Membership in Oom-
munist Party.-A member of Communist Party cannot be loyal 
to his private employer as against any directive of his Com-
munist master. 
[4] Id.-Oontinuing Ground of Discharge-Nonwaiver-Defenses. 
-Employe's membership in Communist Party and her sus-
tained participation in its activities is a type of continuing 
disloyal activity which, as matter of public policy, her em-
ployer should not be held to have waived by its failure to 
discharge her earlier than it did, though it had knowledge 
of such membership. 
[5] Oontracts-Legality-Effect of IUegality-Estoppel.-Parties 
cannot be estopped from relying on defenses based on con-
siderations of public policy. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Arbitration, § 24; [2, 4, 6-8] Master 
and Servant, § 33: [3] Master and Servant, § 10.5; [5] Contracts, 
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[6] Master and Servant-Active Membership in Communist Party 
and Disloyalty to Employer as Continuing Ground for Dis-
charge.-Where employe's membership in Communist Party 
was not shown or asserted by her to have been instance of 
past error but appears to have been studied and calculated 
choice of person of some intellectual attainment and to have 
been persisted in on active and devoted basis at time of hearing 
of arbitration board as to whether her discharge violated 
collective bargaining agreement for personal services between 
employer and union of which she was a member, this was an 
adequate ground for refusing to employ her (whether by orig-
inal refusal to hire or by discharge) and was a continuing 
ground which was available to employer at any time during its 
existence. 
[7] Id.-Right and Duty of Employer to Protect Customers and 
Employes Against Danger of Sabotage, Violence, etc.-Em-
ployer largely engaged in supplying manufactured products to 
government and public has right to protect itself and its cus-
tomers against clear and present danger of continuing a 
Communist Party member in its employ, and also duty to take 
such action as it deems wise to preserve order in its plant and 
to protect its other employes, both union and nonunion, against 
same danger and possibility of sabotage, force, violence and 
the like. 
[8] Id.-Lack of Specific Governmental Regulation - Public 
Policy-Duty of Court to Give Specific Effect To.-Fact 
that employer is not specifically obliged by governmental rp.gu-
lation to discharge employe who is member of Communist 
Pal'ty does not affect its right to do so or the impelling public 
poli~y which militates against order for her reinstatement: 
goV'~rmnent is expected to step in only where employer has 
failed or is unable to act for himself, and he is not obligated. 
to await a governmental decree before taking steps to pl'otect 
himself or to exercise his right to discharge employes who 
on established facts are dedicated to be disloyal to him, to be 
likewise disloyal to labor union they purport to serve, and 
who constitute a continuing risk to both employing company 
and the public depending on company's products. 
[9] Labor-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Discharge of Em-
ploye as not Violation of Agreement.-A finding of arbitration 
board, to which dispute of employe's discharge was submitted 
under collective bargaining agreement between employer and 
union of which employe was member, that employe was dis-
charged because! of her labor union activities is untenable in 
view of fact that her activities were not union activities but 
were Communist Party activities, and in view of fact that 
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she sought cmployment at cmployer's plant so that she could 
more actively and effectively carryon program and activities 
of Communist Party. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco based on an order con· 
firming an arbitration award. Edward Molkenbuhr, Judge. 
Reversed with directions. 
Johnson & Stanton, Gardiner Johnson and Thomas E. 
Stanton, Jr., for Appellant. 
Edises & Treuhaft, Bertram Edises, Henry F. Saunders and 
Edises. Treuhaft, Grossman and Grogan for Respondents. 
Charles R. Garry, George G. Olshausen, Charles P. Scully, 
Arthur J. Goldberg, Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin, 
Fred Okrand, Abraham Gorenfeld, Jay A. Darwin and 
IIRwrence Speiser as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents. 
SCHAUER, J .-Cutter Laboratories, Inc., appeals from a 
judgment entered upon the granting of an order confirming 
the award of an arbitration board. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1291-1293.) By the award. rendered by two of the three 
arbitrators with the third dissenting, it was held that ap-
pellant (hereinafter sometimes termed the company) had dis-
charged one of its employes in violation of a collective bar· 
gaining agreement between appellant and the Bio-Lab Union 
(hereinafter sometimes called the union) of Local 225, United 
Office and Professional Workers of America, and that the 
employe was entitled to reinstatement and to back pay limited 
by the bargaining agreement to eight weeks regular pay less 
any outside earnings or unemployment compensation received 
during such period. We have concluded that, upon the un-
disputed evidence and upon the facts found by the arbitra-
tion board, the company is correct in its contention that the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, that the award is con-
trary to law, that it would contravene public policy for the 
courts of this state to enforce reinstatement of the discharged 
employe, and that the judgment must therefore be reversed. 
From extensive findings made by the arbitration board it 
appears that the employer, Cutter Laboratories, Inc., with 
offices and laboratories locuted in Berkeley, manufactures 
and sells throughout the United States and certain foreign 
countries vaccines, serums, antitoxins and other antibiotics 
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the company was subjel"l lo st.riugeut sct'llrity eoutI'o! by fed-
eral authorities, and its prorlu~ls anci processes are said to be 
peculiarly subject to sabotage. Since World War II the com-
pany has been under no specific contract obligation to any 
governmental agency to discharge employes who are "bad 
security risks"; any obligation to take such steps grows out 
of the duties it owes generally to its customers, its dealers, its 
employes, and its stockholders. 
'rhe Bio-Lab Union of Local 225, United Office and Pro-
fessional Workers of America C.1.0., was recognized in 
February, 1944, by the company pursuant to a National Labor 
Relations Board election. It is a union "generally denomi-
nated as 'left-wing'" and it as well as the U.O.P.W.A. was 
expelled from the C.I.O. in March, 1950. 
The discharged employe, Mrs. Doris Walker, graduated 
from the University of California School of Jurisprudence in 
1942, and is an active member of The State Bar of California. 
She was elected to Phi Beta Kappa ~nd to the editorial board 
of the California Law Review. From 1942 to 1944 she was 
employed as an enforcement attorney with the federal Office 
of Price Administration in San Francisco and from 1944 t(l 
1946 as an attorney with a firm of lawyers in the same city. 
She left the law firm and secured employment as a cannery 
worker sorting and trimming vegetables in three canneries in 
Oakland and San Francisco and (later in 1946) as an organ· 
izer for the Food and Tobacco and Agricultural Workers 
Union. She testified that she went to law school "because I 
was interested in becoming a labor lawyer" and that she left 
the law firm because her "time was spent on routine civil 
matters ... and I became dissatisfied with my work and felt 
that I would rather take a more active role in the field ill 
which I was interested and so I quit in order to take a job 
in a plant." 
In October, 1946, Mrs. Walker sought employment at Cutter 
Laboratories and filled out an application form supplied by 
the company, on which under the heading of "Education" 
she concealed her attendance at law school, her law degree, 
and her admission to practice law in this state. Under the 
heading "Previous Employment" she concealed her entire 
previous employment record and showed a false employment 
as file clerk for six or eight months in 1939 by "John Tripp 
Att 'y," which the company later discovered to be a fictitious 
name. Mrs. Walker also gave a dentist and a lawyer in 
San Francisco as references, but at her request their letters 
) 
./ 
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of rp,p.ommennation to the company did not reveal her subter-
fllg<'. Sh~ states that she intentionally deceived the company 
becaul'ie of her belief it wonld not em ploy her if she were 
truthful. The company hired her as label clerk in its produc-
tion planning department, and in April, 1949, she became a 
clerk typist in the purchasing department. 
At the company plant Mrs. \Valker became active in union 
affairs and in April, 1947, was elected shop chairman and 
also a member of the executive board of Local 225. Late in 
1948 she was elected chief shop steward; her duties as stew-
ard took her to all departments in the plant except the 
executive and administrative departments and primarily en-
tailed representing the union in grievances arising c.nder its 
collective bargaining agreement with the company. In th(> 
spring of 1949 she was elected president of Local 225; her 
term expired December 15, 1949, and a new president was 
elected. 
Meanwhile, in May, 1946, following proceedings before the 
National Labor Relations Board, the company and the union 
entered into a contract; in January, 1947, the wage provisions 
thereof were opened and a 10 cent hourly wage increase 
agreed upon. In April, 1947, Mrs. Walker had been elected 
shop chairman and during the same month she and another 
union official learned that they were being investigated by 
the company as to past employment, character, and Commu-
nist affiliation. In June, 1947, the union served notice of 
intention to amend the contract and at the same time filed 
with the National Labor Relations Board an unfair labor 
practice charge against the company based on the investiga-
tions. A week-long strike ensued in August, 1947, which was 
settled following the intervention of Harry Bridges and as a 
result of negotiation with him. June 9, 1949, the contract 
was again opened, solely as to wages, and November 30, 1949, 
a two-year contract was agreed upon; on October 6, 1949, 
during the negotiations and at a time when company officials 
were angry at certain activities of Mrs. Walker purportedly 
in connection with union demands, the company's discharge 
of Mrs. Walker which is here involved took place. 
At the time of the discharge a company official read to Mrs. 
Walker the following notice: 
"Mrs. Walker: As you are aware, the company has known 
for some time that when you applied for work with Cutter 
Laboratories on October 4 1946, you made a number of false 
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"As we know now, you falsified the statement of YOUl 
('dueation so as to conceal the fact that you had completed a 
law shcoo) [sic] course at the University of California's School 
of J urispl'udence at Berkeley in May, 1942. You con(~ea]ed 
ihe facts that you received the degree of Bachelor of Laws 
in May, 1942, and that you were admitted to the State Bar of 
CaJifornia on December 8, 1942. You concealed that since 
I hat date you have at all times been admitted and entitled to 
practice as an attorney before all of the Conrts of California. 
"We know now that by falsification of the name of a previ-
ous employer, you concealed the fact that from June, 1942 
to February, 1944 you were employed by the Federal Gov-
ernment's Office of Price Administration, including employ-
ment as an Enforcement Attorney at a salary of abont 
$3,200.00 a year. 
"We know now that you deliberately concealed from us 
that from February 1944 to December, 1945 you were em-
ployed as an attorney by Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer and 
Edises, a well-known firm of lawyers specializing in labor cases. 
"You know that a few weeks ago the 'Labor Herald', the 
official CIO newspaper, stated that the National Labor Rela-
tions Board had sustained a cannery firm that had discharged 
you for refusing to answer whether or not you were a Com-
munist. 
"We have checked the records. We know now that you 
deliberately concealed that in 1946, just before you applied 
for work here, you were employed by a series of cannerie~ 
and had been discharged by them. 
"Ordinarily, an employee of the Company would be dis-
charged immediately for falsifying material facts on an 
'Application for Employment'. Because you were an officer 
of the Union we kept you on the pay roll rather than open 
ourselves to a charge of persecuting a union officer. We have 
given your case careful consideration because we know very 
well that no matter how strong the case against you there 
will be a claim of discrimination because of union activities. 
"Because no employer wants to become involved in a dis-
pute of that kind we have been patient and deliberate in our 
consideration of your misconduct. 
"On October 1, 1948, when you testified under oath before 
a Trial Examiner of the National TJubor Relations Board, 
you refused to answer the question as to whether or not you 
were a member of the Communist Party. 
"You refused to answer under oath the question as to 
) 
) 
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whether or not you were or had been a member of the Federal 
'Yorkers' Branch No.3 of the Communist Party. 
, , You refused to testify under oath whether or not you were 
or had bcen a member of the South Side Professional Club of 
the Communist Party. 
"We are convinced now, that you were and still are a 
member of the Communist Party, that you were a member 
of the Federal Workers' Branch No. 3 of the Communist 
Party, and that you were a member of the South Side Pro-
fessional Club of the Communist Party. 
"Our recent investigation of your past record has uncov-
ered previously unknown conduct that goes far beyond a 
mere concealment of material facts. We have just compleied 
a thorough investigation and have a full report upon your 
past activities. We realize now the importance of the facts 
that you concealed from us. We realize the full implications 
of your falsification and misrepresentations. A follow-up and 
investigation of the 'Labor Heralds' recent revelations has 
uncovered a situation far more grave than we expected. 
"We are convinced now that for a number of years, you 
have been and still are a member of the Communist Party. 
We are convinced beyond any question that for a number of 
years you have participated actively in the Communist Party's 
activities. 
"The nature of our company's business requires more than 
the usual precaution against sabotage and subversion. Upon 
a disclosure that any employee is a member of the Communist 
Party, or has participated in other subversive or revolutionary 
activity, we conceive it to be the responsibility of management 
to take action. 
"Confronted with such a situation, any inclination to be 
lellient or to grant a union official special consideration is 
out. In the face of your record there is no alternative open 
to us except to terminate your services at once. Accordingly, 
you are notified now that you are discharged for the causes 
mentioned. You wi11 be paid the full amount due to you 
promptly. " 
"Shortly after" the notice was read to Mrs. Walker, it 
was likewise read to plant employes at a meeting called by 
rhe company. At the meeting statements were made by com-
pany officials "either to the entire group or in private discus-
-;ion afterward, advising- f'lllployees 'to g~t ont of that lpft-wing 
Huion' and telling them that 'nothing- hut a left-wing union 
would press for wa~(' incre>ns('s at this time.'" Following the 
discharge of Mrs. 'Valker negotiations between the union and 
.. , 
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the company continued, and as already mentiolled a hvo-year 
contract was agreed upon on November 30, 1949; it provided 
for wage increases and other contract changes. The company 
also agreed to, and did, pending the holding of a union-shop 
election, join the union in urging all eligible employes and 
all newly-hired eligible employes to become and remain mem-
bers in good standing of the union. 
The arbitration board further found that on October 5, 
1949. following a grievance meeting with union representa-
tives earlier in the day and prior to discharging Mrs. Walker 
on October 6, officials of the company met with its attorneys 
and considered evidence which the attorneys had marshalled 
and which may be summarized as follows: 
a. State Bar records showed no California lawyer named 
John Tripp (a name given by Mrs. Walker to the company, 
as a previous employer), but that there was such a lawyer 
with the given names of John Tripp; it developed that he 
was Mrs. Walker's supervisor in the O.P.A. (1942-1944). 
b. A transcript of N.L.R.B. hearings of September 30 and 
October 1, 1948, in proceedings by discharged cannery work-
ers, including Mrs. Walker, for reinstatement with back 
pay, showed a refusal by Mrs. Walker to answer the question, 
"are you or were you ever a member of the Communist 
Party!" 
c. Statements to the following effect which appeared in 
certain of the Reports of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee 
on Un-American Activities in California for the years 1943, 
1945, 1947, 1948 and 1949: That Mrs. Walker's O.P.A. 
supervisor associated with persons said to be "members of the 
Communist Party organization"; that "attorneys for the 
Communist Party are" the firm of labor lawyers by whom Mrs. 
\Valker was employed in 1944 to 1946; reporting the identity 
of the Communist Political Association with the Communist 
Party despite a change of name "for strategic reasons May 
20-23 1944"; giving a biography of one Archie Brown, an 
admitted Communist Party member and a candidate for 
various public offices on that ticket and mentioning sponsors 
of his from various unions including the United Office and 
Professional Workers of America; and indicating that the 
"People's Daily World," a newspaper, is "the official organ 
of the Communist Party on the west coast." 
d. Four issues of the "People's Daily World" contained 
items concerning Mrs. Walker: her employment by the labor 
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:l 1944 ultcmal.(' delegate to a Slate COllllllittee of "the COlU-
munist Polil.ieal Ass()(~iation"; and in October, 1946, a radio 
program was noted which she conducted on behalf of a 
committee ., for Archie Brown for Governor ... the Commu-
nist write-in candidate." 
e. A photostatic copy of an unaddressed handwritten letter 
dated "7/10/46" and signed with Mrs. Vlalker's maiden name 
discussed the propriety of the introduction of a resolution on 
the maritime strike at the Cannery Workers Club by the 
writer and another, and stated t.hat "I tried to evaluate my 
action, as I try to evaluate whatever I do, from the point of 
view of the welfare of the working class and the strengthening 
of the Party. ,. 
f. 'I'\,;"/I •• unidentified undated documents contained bio-
graphicaJ material" about Mrs. Walker and stated, among 
other things, that she was issued 1945 Communist Party 
membership card No. 40360, that she joined the Communist 
Party in 1942 and had held various positions in various clubs 
and sections of the pat·ty inclnding the "Cannery Club," 
that her present husband was a Comm llnist Party member anel 
organizer, and that in February, 1946, she listed on a Corn· 
munist Party interview form the information that "she gave 
up law practice because it was frustrating to work with people 
she had to work with (namely, professional people)." 
Mrs. Walker was not shown the above described evidence 
when she was discharged. but was confronted with it at the' 
arbitration board hearing, and company attorneys asked hN 
a series of questions concerning it and her Communist .affilia 
tions and a<.>tivities, including the questions, "Are you now 
or have you ever been a member of the Communist Partyf" 
and "Isn't it a fact. Mrs. Wa1ker ... that the reason why 
you sought employment . . . at Cutter Laboratories was 
becau-se you felt and believed, and had it in mind, that by 
obtaiuing that employment at that plant you could mor(' 
actively and more effectively carry 011 the program and the' 
activities of the Comllluni~t Party T" 1VIr8. Walker's attorney 
objected to the questions on the ::rrounds, among others, th;t 
the political affiliations of an employe are immatel'ia1 and that 
by not acting more promptly thl' company had waived the 
Communism issue as a ground for discharge. The board over· 
t"u1ed the objections but also announced that Mrs. WallH'r 
would not be instruetcd to answc>r the questions" if she did 
not care to do so, but that if shl' refused to ans\V('r \\"l' would 
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thereupon refused to answer the questions as an "unwarranted 
invasion into my private beliefs." The ('vidence as to her 
Communist membership and acceptance of party principles, 
with all the implications that flow therefrom. thus stands 
unchallenged and uncontradicted by her and clearly supports 
the board's finding that the company honestly and correctly 
believed her to be a knowing and deliberately acting Com-
munist. 
It was further found by the board that the company's ]947 
investigation of Mrs. Walker indicated that she was a Com-
munist and also disclosed most of the omissions and falsifi-
cations in her application for employment, that "a strong 
case" had been made out that in 1048 the company learned 
of her eannery activities and of the cannery hearings, and 
that th('re was "at least a general indifference on the part of 
the Company about Doris Walker's activities until the autumn 
of 1949 and a specific indifference about obvious • . . cInes 
to her background." The company stated that the reason they 
(lid not discharge Mrs. Walker in'1947 was because of 8 
·lcsire to "lean over backward" rather than to be accused of 
harassing union officials and because company attorneys ad-
vised that there was at that time insufficient evidence to sup-
port a discharge. 
Under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 
in effect when Mrs. Walker was discharged, the company had 
agreed not to interfere with, restrain or coerce employes or 
,liscriminate against them because of membership or lawful 
activity in the union. It further agreed that, except for 
personnel reductions for lack of work or to effect economies, 
it would not discharge an employe "except for just cause." 
Both the union and the company also agreed that they will 
not discriminate against "8 present or prospective employee 
or member because of race, color, creed, national origin, 
J'eligious belief, or Union affiliation"; formerly" political" as 
well as "religious belief" was listed in this contract provision, 
but by negotiation the word "political" was amended out of 
the agreement. The board held that although removal of 
the word" political" seemed to authorize the practice of dis· 
\·rimination because of "political belief," "we are unable to 
,onclude" that the company's agreements not to discriminate 
! IPcause> of union activity and not to discharge except for just 
,'uuse were thereby limited or modified "in such a way as to 
dispose of this dispute." In this connection it is to be noted 
that the old hoax that the Communist Party is but a political 
. ~;. 
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party has been effectively exposed, as is hereinafter shown in 
some detail. 
The company at the board hearings advanced two grounds 
as the basis for discharging Mrs. Walker: "the omissions 
and falsifications in the Application for Employment nnd 
membership in the Communist Party with the full implications 
of dedication to sabotage, force, violence and the like, which 
Party membership is believed to entail." Although finding 
that the company" honestly believed all of these things," and 
that the "accuracy of those beliefs is established in the 
record, " the board further found that the company had not 
satisfactorily explained the delay of two years (from 1947 to 
1949) in asserting the grounds for discharge presented to the 
board and that such grounds were therefore stale. Finally, 
it was found by the board that the reasons assigned by the 
company were not its real reasons for discharging Mrs. 
Walker, and that actuany the discharge, which occurred dur-
ing wage negotiations, was (' retaliatory in nature" and" inter-
fered with, restrained and coerced an employee hecause of 
participation as an officer and negotiator on behalf of the 
Union in a wage negotiation. " As already stated, the board's 
award, based on the above findings, was that the company's 
discharge of Mrs. Walker violated the collective bargaining 
contract provisions against discrimination because of union 
activity and against discharging except for just cause, and 
that she is entitled to reinstatement aud to limited back pay. 
The company failed to comply with the award, the union 
petitioned the superior court for its confirmation, and the 
company asked the court that it be vacated. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1287, 1288.) After a hearing the trial court con-
firmed the award, and this appeal by the company followed. 
Section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, so 
far as here material, that "In either of the following cases 
the superior court . . . must make an order vacating the 
award, upon the application of any party to the arbi-
tration: ... 
" (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers . . ." 
[1] As ground for reversal the company contends, among 
other things and as it contended before the trial court in 
seeking vacation of the award, that an arbitration award 
which directs that a member of the Communist Party who is 
dedicated to that party's program of "sabotage, force, vio-
lence and thf> lib-" b(' reinstatNl to employment in a plant 
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civilians is agaiust public IJoliey, as pxpressed in both {edcral 
and state laws, is therefore illegaJ and void and will not be 
enforced by the courts. With this contention we agree. 
In the eaSe of Loving & Evans v. Blick (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 
603 [204 P.2d 23], this court reversed a judgment confirming 
an arbitrator's a\,,'ard of a disputed sum owing under a build-
ing contract where it appeared that only one of the partners 
of the contracting firm was licensed as required by statute, 
and that neither the other partner nor the partnership held 
such a license. After referring to the principles that (p. 607) 
"a contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for 
the protection of the public and prescribing a penalty for 
the violation thereof is mega) and void, and no action may 
be brought to enforce such con tract" and that (p. 509) 
"ordinarily with respect to arbitration proceedings' the merits 
of the controversy between the parties are flot subject to 
judicial review' [citation] and that' arbitrators are not bound 
by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the rules on the 
admission of evidence expected in jydicial trials," it was held 
(p. 610) that the "power of the arbitrator to determine the 
rights of the parties is dependent upon the existence of a 
valid contract under which such rights might arise," that 
"Section 1281 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for 
submission to arbitration of ' any controversy . . . which 
arises out of a contract,' does not contemplate that the> 
parties may provide for the arbitration of controversies aris· 
ing out of contracts which are expressly declared by law to 
be illegal and against the public policy of the state," that 
(p. 611) "an unlawful transaction cannot be given legal 
vitality by the arbitration process," that (p. 614) "the only 
evidence before the trial court showed without contradiction 
that the contract upon which the award was based was illegal 
and void because of respondents' failure to comply with the 
licensing requirements," and that therefore that court had 
erred in confirming the award. And in Franklin v. Nat C. 
Goldstone Agency (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 628, 630-633 [204 P.2d 
37], a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of 
unlicensed contractors was likewise reversed upon the ground 
that the basic contract was illegal because in violation of the 
statutes and of "the public policy of this state." 
It is at once apparent that the controversy now before us 
presents an even stronger case for refusal to confirm the 
award than was involved in the Loving & Evulls and in the 
Franklin cases. There the illegality was held to exist in the 
) 
800 BLACK V. CUTT1!:R LABORATORIES [43 C.2d 
l~onl.l·a('f,s upon whieh the uwal'ds wcrc based, while here fh~ 
very award itsdf is illegal in that it. orders reinstatement as an 
employe of one whose d('r1i(~ation to and active support of 
Communist principles and practices stands proved and un-
challenged in the record. As is hereinafter shown, the true 
implications of knowing membership in and support of the 
Communist Party are no longer open to doubt, and the long 
overworked party line theme that Communism is but a politi-
cal activity has been exposed as a false and fraudulent strata-
gem designed particularly as a device for securing, in the free 
nations having government by law, legal support for the 
, , party" in carrying on to the end of its illegal objectives. 
The Congress of the United States, in adopting the In'i;ernal 
Security Act of 1950, declared the dangers of the Communist 
movement in the following terms (Act of Sept. 23, 1950, 
I'h. 1024, tit. I, § 2, 64 Stats. 987; 50 U.S.C.A. § 781) : 
" As a result of evidence adduced before various committees 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, the Congress 
finds that-
" (1) There exists a world Communist movement which in 
its origins, its development, and its present practice, is a 
world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by 
treachery, deceit, infiltration into other groups (governmental 
and otherwise), espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other 
means deemed necessary, to establish a Communist totalitarian 
dictatorship in the countries throughout the world through 
the medium of a world-wide Communist organization. 
"(2) The establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in 
any country results in the suppression of all opposition to the 
party in power, the subordination of the rights of individuals 
to the state, the denial of fundamental rights and liberties 
which are characteristic of a representative form of govern-
ment, such as freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, 
and of religious worship, and results in the maintenance of 
control over the people through fear, terrorism, and bru-
tality .... 
"(9) In the United States those individuals who knowingly 
and willfully participate in the world Communist movement, 
when they so participate, in effect repudiate their allegiance 
to the United States, and in effect transfer their allegiance 
to the foreign country in which is vested the direction and 
control of the world Communist movement .... 
" (15) The Communist movement in the United States is 
an organization numbering thousands of udherents, rigidly 
) 
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and ruthlessly disciplined. Awaiting and seeking to advalWP 
a moment when the United States may be so far extended 
by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far 
in industrial or financial straits, that overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of the United States by force and violence may seem 
possible of achievement, it seeks converts far and wide by an 
extensive system of schooling and indoctrination. Such prepa-
rations by Communist organizations in other countries have 
aided in supplanting existing governments. The Communist 
organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objec-
tives, tha recent successes of Communist methods in other 
countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist 
movement itself, present a clear and present danger to the 
security of the United States and to the existence of free 
American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, 
in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the 
sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, 
and to guarantee to each State a republi~an form of govern-
ment, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence 
of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from 
accomplishing its purpose in the United States." 
And in the Smith Act (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 
Stats. 808; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385) it was provided that "Who-
ever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches 
the • • • overthrowing or destroying the government of the 
United States or . . . of any State . . . by force or violence, 
or • • • Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize 
any society, group, or assembly of persons who ... encourage 
the overthrow or destruction of any such government by 
force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates 
with, any such ... assembly of persons, knowing the purposes 
thereof" is guilty of a crime. 
More recently, in adopting the Communist Control Act of 
1954 (PuDlic Law 637, ch. 886, approved August 24, 1954), 
our Congress further expressed its, and necessitates our, 
awareness of the true nature of the party program and 
methods, in these findings of fact: "Sec. 2. The Congress 
hereby finds and declares that the Communist Party of the 
United States, although purportedly a political party, is in 
fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the 
Government of the United States. It constitutes an authori-
tarian dictatorship within a republic, demanding for itself 
the rights and privileges accorded to political parties, but 
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lilt illll. fTnlikl' plliit ii'al part iI's, whleh I'\'olv(' thf'ir polif'if's 
tllld prograllls Ihrollglt pi/hli(' means, by the l'eeonciliatioll of 
a wide varidy of individual views, and submit those polieies 
and programs to the electorate at large for approval or dis-
approval, the policies and programs of the Communist Party 
il['e secretly prescribed for it by the foreign leaders of the 
world Communist movement. Its members have no part in 
determining its goals, and are not permitted to voice dissent 
i 0 party objectives. Unlike members of political parties, 
!llembers of the Communist Party are recruited for indoc-
t rination with respect to its objectives and methods, and are 
(lrganized, instructed, and disciplined to earry into action 
..;Iavishly the assignments given them by their hierarchical 
(·hieftains. Unlike political parties, the Communist Party 
aeknowledges no constitutional or statutory limitations upon 
its conduct or upon that of its members. The Communist 
Party is relatively small numerically, and gives scant indica-
1 ion of capacity ever to attain its ends by lawful political 
'lleans. The peril inherent in its operation arises not from 
: ts llumbers, but from its failure to acknowledge any limita-
'ion as to the nature of its activities, and its dedication. to 
he proposition that the present constitutional Government 
,f the United States ultimately must be brought to ruin by 
tlly available means, including resort to force and violence. 
; rolding that doctrine, its role as the agency of a hostile 
foreign power renders its existence a clear present and eon-
tinuing danger to the security of the United States. It is 
the means whereby individuals are seduced into the service 
of the world Communist movement, trained to do its bidding, 
and directed and controlled in the conspiratorial performance 
of their revolutionary services. Therefore, the Communist 
Party should be outlawed." 
A similar awareness was shown by the President of the 
United States in his State of the Union message delivered 
before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives on .January 7, 1954 (l00 Congressional Record 
62, H. Doc. 251), wherein he declared, "The subversive char-
a.cter of the Communist Party in the United States has been 
dearly demonstrated in many ways, including court pro-
ceedings. 'Ve should recognize by law a fact that is plain 
to all thoughtful citizens-that we are dealing here with 
actions akin to treason-that when a citizen knowingly par-
ticipates in the Communist conspiracy he no longer holds 
allegiance to the United States." 
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And in this state the courts have recognized that the type 
of activity found by the board here to have been clwarrcd in '" ~ 
by Mrs. \Valker-i.e., membership "in the Communist Party 
with the full implications of dedication to sabotage, force, 
violence and the like, which Party membership is believed to 
entail "-constitutes a violation of the California Criminal 
Syndicalism Act. (Pen. Code, §§ 11400-11402, formerly 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8428; see People v. McCormick 
(1951), 102 Cal.App.2d Supp. 954, 962 [228 P.2d 349 J ; 
People v. Chambers (1937), 22 Cal.App.2d 687, 709-713 
[72 P.2d 746].) 
The Legislature of California itself has found as facts, 
and has so declared in section 1027.5 of the Government Code, 
t.hat " ... (a) There exists a world-wide revolutionary move· 
ment to establish a totalitarian dictatorship based upon force 
and violence rather than upon law .... 
" (d) \Vithin the boundaries of the State of California 
there are active disciplined communist o-rganizatiolls pres· 
ently functioning for the primary purpose of advancing tht' 
objectives of the world communism movement, which organ· 
izations promulgate, advocate, and adhere to the precepts 
and the principles and doctrines of the world communism 
movement. These communist organizations are characterized 
by identification of theil' programs, policies, and objectives 
with those of the world communism movement, and they regu-
larly and consistently cooperate with and endeavor to carry 
into execution programs, policies and objectives substantially 
identical to programs, policie!ll, and objectives of such worla 
communism movement. . . . 
"There is a clear and present danger, which the Legis-
lature of the State of California finds is great and imminent, 
that in order to advance the program, policies and objectives 
of the world communism movement, communist organiza· 
tions in the State of California and their members will en· 
gage in concerted effort to hamper, restrict, interfere with. 
impede, or nullify the efforts of the State and the public-
agencies of the State to comply with and enforce the laws of 
the State of California ... " 
Further evidencing the implications of membership in the 
Communist Party and the policy of the state in respect there· 
to, the I .. egislatul'e has declared that (Gov. Code, § 1028) : 
"It sltall be suffieient eaus(' for the dismissal of an~' publil' 
employee whell such public employee aavocat('s (l)' is Imow· 
ingly a member of the Communist Party or of an organiza. 
) 
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tion which during the time of his membership he knows 
advocates overthrow of the Government of the United States 
or of any state by force or violence." (See also Board of 
Education v. Wilkinson (1954), 125 Cal.App.2d 100 [270 
P.2d 82].) [2] A private employer, particularly one largely 
engaged in supplying manufactured products to the govern· 
ment, to its armed forces, and to retailers for distribution 
through hospitals and doctors to the public at large, should 
not be required by state action through its courts (see Skelley 
v. Kt'aemer (1948), 334 U.S. 1 [68 8.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 
3 A.L.R.2d 441]; Hurd v. Hodge (1948), 334 U.S. 24 [68 
S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187]) to retain in or restore to employ-
ment a person who would not be entitled to state employ-
ment and who is known to have dedicated herself to the ser-
vice of a foreign power and to the practice of sabotage to 
the end of overthrowing our government. 
Graphically depictive of the nature of the Communist con-
spiracy and of the extremes to which it is prepared to resort 
are the following statements by Mr. Justice Jackson, con-
curring in Dennis v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 494, 
564-565 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1181] : "The Communist 
Party, nevertheless, does not seek its strength primarily in 
numbers. Its aim is a relatively small party whose strength 
is in selected, dedicated, indoctrinated, and rigidly disciplined 
members. From established policy it tolerates no deviation 
and no debate. It seeks members that are, or may be, secreted 
in strategic posts in transportation, communications, industry, 
government, and especially in labor unions where it can com-
pel employers to accept and retain its members. It also 
seeks to infiltrate and control organizations of professional 
and other groups. Through these placements in positions of 
power it seeks a leverage over society that will make up in 
power of coercion what it lacks in power of persuasion. 
"The Communists hav~ no scruples against sabotage, terror-
ism, assassination, or mob disorder; but violence is not with 
them, as with the anarchists, an end in itself. The Communist 
Party advocates force only when prudent and profitable. 
Their strategy of stealth precludes premature or uncoordi-
nated outbursts of violence, except, of course, when the blame 
will be placed on shoulders other than their own. They 
resort to violence as to truth, not as a principle but as an 
expedient. Force or violence, as they would resort to it, 
may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception 
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"Force would ue utilizeu by tLe COlillHunist Party uot 
to destroy government but for its capture. The Communist 
recognizes that an established government in contro] of 
modern technology cannot be overthrown by force until it 
is about ready to fall of its own weight. Concerted uprising, 
therefore, is to await that contingency and revolution is seen, 
not as a sudden episode, but as the consummation of a long 
process.' , 
Other instances of recognition by the courts of the clear 
and present danger to this country and to its institutions 
presented by the Communist Party and its adherents may be 
found in decisions upholding the provisions of the IJahor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the Taft-
Hartley Act, (Act, June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 1 et seq.; 61 
Stats. 136 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.), which deny the 
privilege of being chosen as exclusive bargaining agent to a 
union whose officers have not filed with the National Lahor 
Relations Board their affidavits denying membership or affilia-
tion with the Communist Party and denying belief in the 
overthrow of the United States Government by force (see 
American Oommunications Assn., 0.1.0. v. Douds (1950), 
339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925] ; National Maritime 
Union of America v. Herzog (D.C., 1948), 78 F.Supp. 146, 
affirmed 334 U.S. 854 [68 S.Ct. 1529, 92 L.Ed. 1776] ; Inland 
Steel 00. v. National Labor Relations Board (C.C.A. 7,1948), 
170 F.2d 247, 264-267, affirmed 339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 
94 L.Ed. 925]), as well as in cases sustaining other legisla-
tion or Congressional inquiry directed at exposing and con-
trolling Communist activities in this country. (See Lawson 
v. United States (C.C.A., D.C., 1949), 176 F.2d 49, certiorari 
denied, 339 U.S. 934 [70 S.Ct. 663, 94 L.Ed. 1352]; United 
States v. DLlJlnis (C.C.A., 2, 1950), 183 F.2d 201, 212-213, 
affirmed, Dennis v. United States (1951), supra, 341 U.S. 
494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137] ; Barsky v. United States, 
(O.C.A., D.C., 1948), 167 F.2d 241, 247, certiorari denied, 
334 U.S. 843 [68 S.Ct. 1511, 92 L.Ed. 1767 j ; Galvan v. Press 
(1953),347 U.S. 522, 529 [74 S.Ot. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911].) In 
the Douds case, supra, the court pointed out that before en-
acting the Taft-Hartley Act "Congress had a great mass of 
material before it which tended to show that Communi~ts 
and others proscribed by the statute had infiltrated unioll 
organizations not to support and further trade union objec-
tives. including the advocacy of change by democratic 
llletllOuS, but to make them a device by which commerce and 
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ilHlllstl'Y might be clisruplp!l when the dictates of political 
policy required such action." (P. 389 of 839 U.S.) 
Also relevant are the following comments of the court in 
Garner v. Board of Public Works (1950),98 Cal.App.2d 493, 
498 [220 P.2d 958], affirmed, (1951), 341 U.S. 716 [71 S.Ct. 
909, 95 L.Ed. 1317], in upholding an ordinance requiring a 
loyalty oath for municipal employes: "One of the foundation 
stones of private business is that the employe must be loyal 
to his employer. Loyalty is implicit in the contract of hiring. 
No private business can long succeed without the conscientious, 
undivided support of its employes. The man or woman who 
denies allegiance to his employment is, and should be, soon 
separated from it. . • . And, so long as the employment con-
tinues, every employer has the right at any time to ask his 
employe to declare his loyalty." To the same effect is 
the holding in National Labor Relations Board v. Inter· 
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (1953), 346 U.S. 
46~, 472 [74 8.Ct. 172, 98 L.Ed. 195], "There is no more 
elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty 
to his employer." (See also National Labor Relations Board 
v. Jones &- Laughlin Steel Gorp. (1937), 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 
[57 8.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352]; RKO Radio 
Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico (1954), 128 Cal.App.2d 172 [274 
P.2d 928].) [3] From the array of congressional and legisla-
tive findings which have been quoted above, if not from the 
common knowledge of mankind, it must be accepted as con· 
clusively established that a member of the Communist Party 
cannot be loyal to his private employer as against any direc-
tive of his Communist master. 
[4] We are of the view, further, that the type of activity 
engaged in by the employe here-membership in the Com-
munist Party and sustained participation in its activities-is 
one which as a matter of public policy the company should 
not be held to have waived by its failure to discharge her 
earlier than it did. [5] In the first place, it is an established 
principle that parties cannot be estopped from relying on 
defenses based on considerations of public policy, such as 
illegal contracts. (See Fewel &- Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt (1941), 
17 Cal.2d 85, 91 [109 P.2d 650J ; American Nat. Bank v. A. 
G. Sommerville, Inc. (1923), 19] Cal. 364, 371 [216 P. 376].) 
[6] In the second place, the cmploye's party membership 
was not shown or evcLI asserted by her to have been an 
instance of past error but appears, rather, to have been the 
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attainment, and to have been persisted in on an active and 
devoted basis even at the time of the board hearings. Thus 
an entirely adequate ground for refusing to employ her 
(whether by original refusal to hire or by discharge) was a 
continuing one which was available to the employer at any 
time during its existence. [7] In this connection it may 
also be noted that the employer had not only the right to 
protect itself and its customers against the clear and present 
danger of continuing a Communist Party member in its 
employ, but also the duty to take such action as it deemed 
wise to preserve order in its plant and to protect its other 
employes, both union and nonunion, against the same danger 
and the possibility of "sabotage, force, violence and the like." 
The company properly stated in its notice of discharge, as 
related above, "The nature of our company's business re-
quires more than the usual precaution against sabotage and 
subversion. Upon a disclosure that any employe is a member 
of the Communist Party . . • we con.ceive it to be the re-
sponsibility of management to take action." Knowing the 
facts which the company knew, it is difficult to conceive of 
any tenable defense which it could make, or which would be 
entertained in this court, as against an action for damages 
in a personal injury or wrongful death case arising from the 
wilful adulteration of any of its products by Mrs. Walker 
if it continued her in its employ and she should thereafter 
take that means of party activity. That acts of sabotage by 
Communists are reasonably to be expected at any time such 
acts may be directed by the party leader is not open to 
question, as has already been shown. 
[8] The fact that the company was not specifically obliged 
by any governmental regulation to discharge Mrs. Walker 
affects in nowise its right to do so or the impelling public 
policy which militates against the order for her reinstatement; 
in this country, built as it has been upon the initiative and 
self-reliance of its citizens, the government is expected to 
step in only where the employer has failed or is unable to act 
for himself, and he is not obligated to await a governmental 
decree before taking steps to protect himself or to exercise 
his right to discharge employes who upon the established 
facts are dedicated to be disloyal to him, to be likewise dis-
loyal to the Ameriean labor union they may purport to serve, 
and who constitute a continuing risk to both the employing 
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This is not the first time that this court has been called 
upon to recognize and give specific effect to the public policy 
where its duty in the premises is clear. (See James v. Marin-
ship Corp. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 
900] ; Hughes v. Superior Court (1948), 32 Ca1.2d 850 [198 
P.2d 885], affirmed 339 U.S. 460 [70 8.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985] ; 
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Inll. Assn. (1953), 41 
Ca1.2d 567, 574-575 [261 P.2d 721] ; see also National Labor 
Rel. Board v. Cincinnati Chem. Wks. (1944), 144 F.2d 597; 
National Labor Relations Board v. KeZeo Corp. (1949), 178 
F.2d 578.) 
[9] Lastly, in the light of the undisputed evidence and 
of the specific findings of fact made by the arbitration board, 
it clearly appears that the conclusional finding that Mrs. 
Walker was discharged because of her labor union activities 
is untenable. We have here an exemplification of that which 
Justice Jackson (in Dennis v. United States (1941), supra, 
341 U.S. 494, 564 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137, 1181]) so 
clearly envisaged when he said of the Communist Party: 
"From established policy it tolerates no deviation and no 
debate. It seeks members that are, or may be secreted in 
strategic posts in . . . industry . . . and especially in labor 
unions where it can compel employers to accept and retain its 
members, " and of that to which the court referred when it 
stated in American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds 
(1950), supra, 339 U.S. 382, 389 [70 8.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925] : 
"Congress [in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act] had a great 
mass of material before it which tended to show that Com-
munists and others proscribed by the statute had infiltrated 
union organizations not to support and further trade union 
objectives ••• but to make them a device by which com-
merce and industry might be disrupted • . ." The issue of 
labor union activity herein is manifestly a false one, a subter-
fuge injected not to promote the cause of American labor 
but to further the Communist Party line. Mrs. Walker, as 
a Communist, was not at any time or in any of her activities 
truly serving the cause of an American labor union or the 
illterests of an American laboring man; she was but doing 
the bidding and serving the cause of her foreign master who 
"tolerates no deviation and 110 debate." Her activities, there-
fol'(>, upon allY reasonable view of the evidence and the 
specific findi1lgs of fact, were 1Iot in truth union labor activities 
but were Communist Part.y activities. 
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------ ... ----
at tllP Hrbitratioll hUi/l'tf IU'urillg Mrs. W;jlk~r was asked, 
and she refused to aJls\,'cr the Itll('StiIJIl, "Isn't it a fact, 
Mrs. Walker .•. that the reason why you sought employ-
ment . . . at Cutter Laboratories was because you felt and 
believed, and had it in mind, that by obtaining that employ-
ment at that plant you could more actively and more effec-
tively carryon the program and the activities of the Com-
munist Party'" It is, we think, indisputable that if Mrs. 
Walker sought and obtained employment at Cutter Labor-
atories so that she "could more actively and more effectively 
carryon the program and the activities of the Communist 
Party," her reinstatement in that employment would serve 
no cause save that of the Communist conspiracy. The courts 
of this country by making such an order would be but aiding 
toward destruction of the government they are sworn to 
uphold. The contract between Cutter Laboratories and the 
Bio-Lab Union cannot be construed, and will not be en-
forced, to protect activities by a Communist on behalf of her 
party whether in the guise of unionism or otherwise. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein 
expressed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-All the members of the conrt 
agree that we are bound by the determination of the arbi-
trators- that for two and one-half years Doris Walker's com-
.,' While there is a work stoppage and a strike in this collective bar-
gaining history [during Doris Walker's employment], both were directed 
at wage and contract issues. There is no evidence of any work stoppage, 
strike or other interference with production, the avowed ob.iective of 
which was political, philosophical, subversive or revolutionary. . . • 
"It is admitted that Doris Walker's conduct and the quality of her 
work were no different in 1949 from what they were in 1947. It is un-
contradicted on the record that all of the essential facts upon which tile 
discharge was based were in existence in 1947 and some years before. 
And finally, it is established to our satisfaction, by admission of the 
Company and by proof, that the reasons assigned in 1949 by the Com· 
pany for the discharge were both known and believed by the Company 
in 1947. 
"This statE" of the record raises a doubt that the Company ever took 
the assigned grounds for discharge seriously. • • • 
"Finally, it appears, by admission of the Company, that notwith-
standing the 1947 investigative report, there was no further investigation 
until the autumn of 1949. This is inexplicable to us if there was real 
concern about the combination of Communist Party membe!'ship and the 
omissions and fnlsili('ntions disclosed hy the 1947 in\'estigative report • 
• , Frow. all of this we are Wl&ble to find any aatisfactorl excuse for 
J 
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mllnist affiliat.ions were a matter of indiffercnce to Clltter, 
'hat. Cutter thcl'efore waived her commnlliHI: affiliat.ions as a 
ground for discharging her, that it disehargcd her solely be-
cause of her lawful union activity, and that in doing so it 
violated its collective bargaining agreement witb the Union. 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280-1293: Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. 
v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Ca1.2d 228, 233 [174 P.2d 44]] ; Sapp v. 
Barenfeld, 34 Ca1.2d 515, 523 [212 P.2d 283]: Crofoot v. 
Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 185 f260 P.2d 
l56] ; sce Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Ca1.2d 603, 609 f204 
P.2(1 23].) It would seem necessarily to follow that we should 
affirm the judgment of the superior court confirming the 
a ward. The majority opinion holds, however, "that an arbi-
tration award which directs that a member of the Communist 
the Company's delay of over two years in asserting the grounds for dis-
charge presented here. Contract relationships lose effectiveness if griev· 
ances about performance are not promptly discussed, settled or brought 
to an issue. This cuts both ways: unadjusted dissatisfactions of either 
employer or employees cumulate and exaggerate the importance of en· 
suing minor dissatisfactions. It seenlS to us that a commonplace of any 
'just' system of discipline is the swift imposition of the penalty upon 
the heels of discovery of the offense. Under an agreement like this one, 
an employer should not be entitled to carry mutually known grounds for 
discharge in his hip pocket indetinitely for future convenient use. 
, 'In view of the foregoing considerations, we find that the grounds 
asserted by the Company for the discharge were stale. . . . 
"The discharge of a top Union official and negotiator at a passionate 
climax in the middle of a stubbornly contested wage negotiation, stand· 
ing alone, raises an inference that the discharge is retaliatory in nature 
and designed to restrain, coerce or interfere with the employee because 
of lawful Union activity. And we find convincing circumstantial evi-
dence to support this inference. 
"Two things that had lain fallow appear to have come to life when 
the Union opened the agreement for wage adjustment in June of 1949. 
The Company then put into use a new form of Application for Employ-
ment which for the first time asked questions about religion and Com· 
munist affiliation. Then also, for the first time in over two years, the 
Company ordered a fresh investigation into Doris Walker's Communist 
affiliations. 
"The discharge took place in a wave of heat over a radio broadcast 
and a newspaper advertisement, neither of which was complimentary. 
But they do not appear to have made any original contribution to the 
usual exchanges that go on during most wage negotiations. 
"While the quality of Doris Walker's conduct and performance on the 
job remained unchanged 4'or three years, her position of importance in 
the Union had progressively increased. It was only a few months before 
the wage negotiation opened that she was elected President of the Local; 
and she was a memher of the Union negotiating committee ...• 
"In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we find that Doris 
Walker was unjustly discharged, that the reasons assigned by the Com-
pany for the discharge were not the real reasons and had been waived, 
and that the discllarge interfered with, restrained and coerced an 
employee because of participation as an officer and negotiator on behalf 
of the Union in a wage negotiation." 
) 
) 
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Party who is dedicated to that party's program of 'sabotage, 
force, violence and the like' be reinstated to employment in 
a plant which produces antibiotics used by both the military 
and civilians is against public policy, as expressed in both 
federal and state laws, is therefore illegal and void and will 
not be enforced by the courts." Thus, even though an em· 
ployer is indifferent to the fact that an employee is a Com-
munist and is therefore no longer free under a collective 
bargaining contract to discharge him for being a Communist. 
it can nevertheless violate its contract not to discharge him 
for lawful union activity and use the fact that he is a Com-
munist as an excuse for its unlawful action. It can do so 
because this court holds that the employment of a Com-
munist poses such a threat to the security of the country that 
a contract by an employer with a union to keep a known 
Communist in its employ is against public policy and is there-
fore illegal. A fortiori such a contract by an employer with 
the employee is illegal. Thus by judicial.fiat, but without the 
temerity to declare that Communists are deprived of civil 
rights (see Civ. Code, § 1556), the court abrogates not only 
the right of employers and unions to contract for the em-
ployment of Communists, but the right of Communists as a 
class to enter into binding contracts. It does so by invoking 
public policy in violation of clearly stated policies of the 
Legislature (Civ. Code, § 1556; Lab. Code, § 923; Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1280-1293) and in a field in which Congress and 
the Legislature have clearly indicated their competence to deal 
with the problems involved. 
Section 1556 of the Civil Code provides that "All persons 
are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound 
mind, and persons deprived of civil rights." (See also 
1 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.] § 222, pp. 669-670.) To 
deny persons other than those mentioned in this section the 
right to enter into employment contracts is to repeal pro tanto 
its provisions with respect to the class of contracts of greatest 
importance to those who must work for a living. Even if this 
court were at liberty so to repeal the statute, there are com-
pelling reasons why it ~hould not do so. 
It is true that in thj~ case only an employment contract is 
involved. Th.;re is not.hing in the rationale of the majority 
opinioll, however, that limits its application to such contracts. 
If it is illegal to employ a Communist, is it illegal to allow 
a Communist unemployment benefits T If the threat of com-
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Communist illegal as against public policy, does it not also 
invalidate other contracts T 'l'hus, can a landlord break his 
lease with a Communist on th~ ground that his building may 
be sabotaged Y Can a buyer refuse to accept and pay for 
goods purchased from a Communist on the ground that they 
may contain cleverly concealed defects Y Can a seller refuse 
to deliver goods sold to a Communist on the ground that they 
may be used to promote communist activities Y Can an owner 
refuse to pay for construction work by a licensed contractor 
who is a Communist' Indeed, can a Communist be licensed 
as a contractor Y If contracts with Communists are illegal, 
cannot Communists themselves violate them with impunity T 
If breaches of contract can be defended on the ground that 
one of the parties is a Communist, certainly a hearing will 
not be denied the alleged Communist on the issue of whether 
or not he is a Communist. The communist problem, which the 
court has thus injected into private litigation, may therefore 
dominatp all snch liti!1"ation and become one of the principal 
preoccupations of courts. To what end f Certainly private 
litigation does not lend itself to the formulation of a solution 
to the problem of what to do with Communists. It is a rash 
assumption that Congress and the Legislature have been 
inept in their consideration or the problem, or are incapable 
of meeting it, or that astride the "unruly horse" of public 
policy (National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Winter, 58 Cal.App.2d 11, 
22 (136 P.2d 22]) courts are better able to meet it. 
It is obvious that Cutter cannot properly invoke public 
policy on its own behalf. Doris \Valker's work was satis-
factory and her union activities were consistent with legiti-
mate trade-union objectives. Her presence at Cutter presented 
at most a threat that she might attempt to use her position 
for subversive activities. That risk, however, was one that 
Cutter itself did not consider serious enough to disqualify 
her for employment, and it has been materially lessened by 
the fact that her communism has been thoroughly exposed. 
As an afterthought, Cntter now uses this threat as an excuse 
not ouly for discharging her for lawful union activity in 
violation of its contract, but for attacking an arbitration 
award that it had agreed should be "final and binding" upon 
it. By sanctioning these violations of Cutter's contract this 
COllrt not only defeats the public policy in favor of employee 
organization free of employer interference and coercion (Lab. 
Code, § 923; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 
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dispu1es b;v arhjU'afioll (node (~i\'_ Prt l ('., §5 l"S(l l"!I::) IIIIf 
needlessly introd1lces ('ollfnsioll illto a fif'ld ill \\hil·1t (\)Jl. 
gress has already undertaken to formulate a workable policy. 
(50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.) 
It is true that there are sensitive areas in which no Com· 
munist should be employed. We cannot assume. however. 
that the security system established by the federal govern· 
ment is not adequate to protect these areas from subversivt' 
persons. As the very authorities cited in t.he majority opinioll 
make clear, neither Congress in enacting subversive control 
legislation nor the executive department in enforcing it has 
been insensitive to the nation's security. To date, however, 
Congress has not seen fit to make mere membership in the 
Communist Party a crime or to prohibit persons from entering 
into employment or other contracts with Communists. Simi-
larly, the executive department has not undertaken to 
prosecute all Communists under the Smith Act. (18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2385.) It is not the policy of the United States that all 
Communists are without legal rights and should be interned. 
So long as they may legally remain at large they shonld be 
allowed to earn a living. Even resident enemy aliens, whose 
activities have not been restricted by Congress or the Presi-
dent, may engage in time of war in ordinary activities and 
make binding contracts of employment or other contracts. 
(Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 74 [63 8. Ct. 115, 87 L.Ed. 
58] ; Heiler v. Goodman's Motor Express Van & S. 00., 92 
N.J. 415 [105 A. 233, 235-236, 3 A.L.R. 336]; Techt v. 
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 239 [128 N.E. 185, 11 A.L.R. 166]; 
State v. Dar-win, 102 Wash. 402 [173 P. 29, 30-31, L.R.A. 
1918F 1012].) 
It must be obvious that in passing on the validity of 
ordinary employment contracts in litigation between private 
parties, courts are in no position effectively to evaluate the 
security factors that should determine what jobs Communists 
should or should not hold. In its finding of necessity for the 
enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 781 et seq.) Congress demonstrated its awareness of the 
communist problem and specifically established in that act 
the policy of the United States with respect to the employ-
ment of Communists. It did not prohibit all hiring of Com-
munists nor did it leave to the courts the decision as to what 
jobs Communists might hold. It provided instead that the 
Secretary of Defense should determine and designate the 
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IwganizatiollS should not be- employed. - Cutter has not been 
so designated, and wc may therefore assume that the em-
ployment of a Communist at Cutter poses no threat to the 
security of the country. I see no evidence of congressional 
incompetence or of executive negligence in this respect. nor 
do I see any evidence of superior wisdom, facilities, or tech-
niques available to this court that would justify its intrusion 
into policy malting in this field. It is my opinion that we can 
still safely leave to the legislative branch of the government 
the formulation of policies for the security of the country, 
and I would therefore affirm the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
16, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
·Section 784(a) of the act provides that" When a Communist organ· 
ization .. is registered or there is in effect a final order of the 
LSubversive Activities Control] Board requiring such organization to 
register, it shall be unlawful-- (1) For any member of such organiza' 
tion • . . (D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization, 
to engage in any employment in any defense facility." Section 784(b) 
provides that "The Secretary of Defense is authorized and directed to 
designate and proclaim .. _ a list of facilities • • . with respect to the 
operaticn of which he finds and determines that the security of the 
United States requires the application of the provisions of subsectioD 
(a) of this section." 
